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 1. Introduction 
 To the extent that William James had an account of ‘meaning’, 1 it is best captured in his “prag-
matic maxim”, which takes perhaps its “canonical” form as follows: 
 To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, then, we need only consider 
what e ects of a conceivably practical kind the object may involve – what sensations 
we are to expect from it, and what reactions we must prepare. Our conception of these 
e ects, then, is for us the whole of our conception of the object, so far as that concep-
tion has positive signifi cance at all. 2
 However, James’s maxim has been subject to a number of confl icting interpretations, 3 and the 
following will argue that some of these interpretive di  culties stem from the fact that (1) James 
seriously understates the di erences between his own views and those presented by Peirce in 
“How to Make Our Ideas Clear”, and (2) James’s understanding of the maxim typically ties 
meaning to truth, but since James (or at least the James of  Pragmatism ) takes “truth” talk to 
stretch from “temporary” to “absolute” truth, a similar ‘elasticity’ can be found in his conception 
of meaning. However, this ‘elasticity’ is found in our everyday talk of meaning as well, and James 
manages to capture it in a more cohesive way than more contemporary accounts that often try 
to do so by positing two completely distinct types of meaning or content. 
 2. James’s pragmatic maxim and its ‘Peircian’ interpretation 
 While there are many ways James’s maxim could be understood, the most obvious way would 
be to do so in terms of the maxim presented by Peirce in his seminal paper, “How to Make Our 
Ideas Clear”, namely, “Consider what e ects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, 
we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then our conception of these e ects is the 
whole of our conception of the object” ( Peirce 1878 : 132). After all, the wording these canoni-
cal statements of Peirce’s and James’s maxims is extremely similar, and right after presenting his 
version, James describes it not only as “the principle of pragmatism” but also as “the principle 
of Peirce”. 4 Of course, the interpretation of Peirce’s own version of the maxim is up for debate, 
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and Peirce arguably changed his understanding of his maxim over the years, 5 but one popular, 
and natural, way to understand the “e ects” in the Peircian maxim above is as the  sensible e ects. 
As Peirce puts it right before presenting his version of the maxim, “Our idea of anything  is our 
idea of its sensible e ects” ( Peirce 1878 : 132). 
 The Peircian maxim is thus often read as amounting to a form of verifi cationism, 6 and 
Peirce gives us good reason for such a reading. Not only does he tie meaning exclusively to 
sensation (or at least “sensible e ects”) in the passage above, but (like the logical positivists) he 
thought that his preferred account of meaning would show most metaphysical discourse to be 
“meaningless gibberish” so that what would be left for philosophy would be “a series of prob-
lems capable of investigation by the observational methods of the true sciences” (Peirce 1905a: 
338). Further (and crucially), perhaps the clearest applications of the maxim that Peirce gives 
in that original paper, his discussion of transubstantiation, has a distinctly verifi cationist feel. In 
particular, he argues that since “we can . . . mean nothing by wine but what has certain e ects, 
direct or indirect, upon our senses”, it follows that “talk of something as having all the sensible 
characters of wine, yet being in reality blood, is senseless jargon” ( Peirce 1878 : 131). As we shall 
soon see, James had a very di erent understanding of how the maxim would apply to the topic 
of transubstantiation, and that di erence will give us a compelling reason to think that he must 
have something di erent from this straightforwardly ‘Peircian’ version of the maxim in mind. 
 One pressing problem for the Peircian maxim as a reading of James is that it seems poorly 
suited for explaining the meaning of  normative , particularly  ethical statements. 7 Statements about 
the way things ought to be (rather than how they are) seem to have no predictive import, which 
would suggest, on this Peircian reading of the pragmatic maxim, that no practical consequences 
follow from them. There may be, for instance, no sensible e ects following from the truth of a 
statement like “eating meat is always wrong” since, after all, most people could continue to enjoy 
eating meat forever in spite of its being wrong. Positivists were often willing to embrace this 
consequence (suggesting, say, the moral discourse had ‘emotive’, rather than cognitive, content), 8
and while Peirce was occasionally ambivalent about ethical inquiry, 9 ruling out the meaningful-
ness of ethical discourse from the start would be quite alien to James’s approach to philosophy. 10
 With this in mind, we should remember that while James claimed that his maxim was 
essentially Peirce’s, he also suggested that the maxim should be “expressed more broadly” than 
Peirce did (P: 259; EPh: 124), and while pragmatism seems uncomfortably close to verifi ca-
tionism when one understands “practical consequences” to simply be Peirce’s “sensible e ects”, 
there are good reasons to think that James never understood “practical consequences” in such 
a restrictive fashion. 
 3. James’s ‘two-pronged’ version of the maxim 
 When comparing James’s and Peirce’s canonical statements of their maxims, it is noteworthy 
that while Peirce originally presents an explication of what makes up the content of our beliefs 
in terms of a single (albeit complex) factor, namely, the “e ects, that might conceivably have 
practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have”, James’s canonical version 
elaborates on these ‘e ects of a conceivably practical kind’ in an explicitly ‘two-pronged’ way, 
stressing that they involve not only a sensory component (“what sensations we are to expect”), 
but also a practical component (“what reactions we must prepare”) (P: 259; EPh: 124; P: 29). 11
This two-pronged presentation of the maxim as including both a sensory and a practical com-
ponent is typical of James. So, for instance, in  Baldwin’s Dictionary he characterizes pragmatism as 
the doctrine that “the whole ‘meaning’ of a conception expresses itself in practical consequences, 
consequences either in the shape of conduct to be recommended, or in that of experiences to 
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be expected, if the conception be true” (EPh: 94), while in  The Varieties of Religious Experience
he writes, “To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, we need then only consider 
what sensations, immediate or remote, we are conceivably to expect from it, and what conduct 
we must prepare in case the object should be true” (VRE: 351). In fact, of the two, he often 
seems to treat the practical component the more important, writing that “the conduct [the 
thought] is fi tted to produce” is its “sole signifi cance” (VRE: 351), 12 and that “the ultimate test 
for us of what a truth means is indeed the conduct it dictates or inspires” (P: 259; EPh: 124). As 
we shall see, this refl ects a general emphasis in his thinking about the relation between concep-
tion and action goes back to his early papers such as “Refl ex Action and Theism”, where he 
insists that “perception and thinking are only there for behavior’s sake” (WB: 92). 
 We can see what di erence that adding this second component can make when we compare 
James’s and Peirce’s discussions of transubstantiation. As we saw earlier, Peirce explicitly states 
that the pragmatic maxim shows that debates about transubstantiation are without signifi cance. 13
James, however, takes the opposite line, arguing that in debates about the Eucharist “the sub-
stance idea” would have “momentous pragmatic value”: 
 Since the accidents of the wafer don’t change in the Lord’s supper, and yet it has 
become the very body of Christ, it must be that the change is in the substance solely. 
The bread-substance must have been withdrawn, and the divine substance substituted 
miraculously without altering the immediate sensible properties. But tho these don’t 
alter, a tremendous di erence has been made, no less a one than this, that we who take 
the sacrament, now feed upon the very substance of divinity. The substance-notion 
breaks into life, then, with tremendous e ect, if once you allow that substances can 
separate from their accidents, and exchange these latter. 
 (P: 46–47) 
 James, rather unhelpfully, doesn’t say what this “tremendous e ect” is supposed to be, but it is 
clear that if the consecrated host really were “the very substance of divinity”, this would make a 
tremendous di erence to the behaviors appropriate around it, and these di erences are refl ected 
in a number of contrasts between Catholic and Protestant religious practice. So, for instance, 
rather than throwing them away, Catholics must preserve in the tabernacle any communion 
wafers that remain after the mass (since the consecrated wafers are supposed to  literally be the 
body of Christ), they must bow to the altar upon entering the church (since the body of Christ 
may  literally be there in the tabernacle) and so forth. 14 “What sensations we are to expect” will 
be the same on both the Catholic and Protestant interpretation of the Eucharist, but “what 
reactions we must prepare” can be very di erent. 
 However, while it is clear that James takes the maxim to involve both a sensory and a practi-
cal component, there is an important ambiguity in James’s view, one that shows up most clearly 
in his presentation of the practical component. For instance, when James ties “what a truth 
means” to “the conduct it dictates or inspires” (P: 259; EPh: 124) he seems to waver between 
something descriptive and dispositional (the conduct the truth ‘inspires’) and something more 
normative (the conduct it ‘dictates’). This wavering is typical, and generally his discussions of 
this second component seem to hover between the descriptive and the normative, 15 and both 
sorts of reading can be applied to his talk of the conduct “recommended” (EPh: 94) by the 
thought, or the conduct it “calls for” (EPh: 124) is “fi tted to produce” (VRE: 351; EPh: 124), 
or “we must prepare” 16 if it is true. This isn’t (or isn’t  just ) careless exposition on James part, and 
there are good reasons for James to make space for both the dispositional and normative versions 
of the maxim, but before we see why, we should look at each of these readings in turn. 
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 4.  e “dispositional” and “normative” readings of the maxim 
 The fi rst reading of the maxim’s practical component is dispositional, where this aspect of the 
meaning of a belief 17 is simply the actions it would cause us to perform, that is, how we would 
be disposed to behave if we had the belief in question. This can lead to perhaps the standard 
explanation of how James’s maxim di ers from the original ‘Peircian’ version: namely, Peirce 
understands a proposition’s meaning in terms of what follows from its truth, while James under-
stands a proposition’s meaning in terms of what follows from its being believed. 18
 James, however, never put things this way himself, and his formulations of the maxim invari-
ably tie content to the practical e ects of a conception’s  truth rather than its being  believed . 19
However, what James frequently  does do is apply the maxim to give the content of a  belief or 
thought rather than an abstract proposition. 20 His focus was always on the psychological states of 
particular people, and his pragmatic maxim is very much tied to his views on the nature of belief. 
 While the embedding of the pragmatic maxim within a theory of belief is downplayed in 
Pragmatism itself, it is clear in his earlier papers like “Philosophical Conceptions and Practical 
Results” where, immediately before presenting the maxim, James writes: 
 Beliefs, in short, are really rules for action; and the whole function of thinking is but 
one step in the production of habits of action. If there were any part of a thought that 
made no di erence in the thought’s practical consequences, then that part would be 
no proper element of the thought’s signifi cance. Thus the same thought may be clad 
in di erent words; but if the di erent words suggest no di erent conduct, they are 
but outer accretions, and have no part in the thought’s meaning. If, however, they 
determine conduct di erently, they are essential elements of the signifi cance. . . . Thus 
to develope a thought’s meaning we need only determine what conduct it is fi tted to 
produce; that conduct is for us its sole signifi cance. And the tangible fact at the root of 
all our thought distinctions, however subtle, is that there is no one of them so fi ne as 
to consist in anything but a possible di erence of practice. 
 (P: 259) 21
 From this ‘functional’ point of view, something like the dispositional reading of the practical 
component (indeed, of the whole maxim) can seem natural: the content of a mental state is a 
function of (1) the experiences that cause it and (2) the behaviors that it causes. As James puts 
it in his “Refl ex Action and Theism”: 
 The structural unit of the nervous system is in fact a triad, neither of whose elements 
has any independent existence. The sensory impression exists only for the sake of 
awaking the central process of refl ection, and the central process of refl ection exists 
only for the sake of calling forth the fi nal act. All action is thus re-action upon the 
outer world; and the middle stage of consideration or contemplation or thinking is 
only a place of transit, the bottom of a loop, both whose ends have their point of 
application in the outer world. 
 (WB: 92) 
 In essence, the content of the second stage of the ‘refl ex arc’ is understood in terms the fi rst 
and third. 22
 Adding even this ‘dispositional’ version of the practical component to the maxim clearly 
makes it better suited for treating normative claims as meaningful than the more purely ‘sensory’ 
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version of the maxim. For instance, since one’s ethical beliefs can e ect one’s behavior in a 
fairly straightforward way, explaining how ethical beliefs are at least  meaningful wouldn’t be a 
problem. James seems to a  rm this connection even in earlier papers like “Rationality, Activity 
and Faith”, where he insists that the question “Is this a moral world?” is meaningful in spite of 
dealing with something non-phenomenal because “any question is full of meaning to which, as 
here, contrary answers lead to contrary behavior” ( James 1882 : 82; WB: 86). 
 That said, tying the meaning of our ethical beliefs merely to how they  dispose us to act seems 
to leave the content of those beliefs overly  subjective . We often do act in ways we take to be 
wrong, and on the dispositional (and thus ‘subjective’) reading, these ‘incontinent’ actions would 
be refl ected in the content of the beliefs themselves, so that, say, my belief that you shouldn’t eat 
meat may come out as meaning that you shouldn’t eat meat unless it looks  really tasty. This seems 
to leave out an important part of the particularly  normative quality of our ethical beliefs, namely 
the they are meant to describe how we think that we  should act, not merely how we  do act. For-
tunately for James, there is a second way that the ‘practical’ component of pragmatic maxim could 
be understood, namely, in explicitly normative (and thus ‘objective’) rather than dispositional 
terms. This reading ties meaning to the e ects that a belief  should have on the believer’s behavior, 
rather than what a ects it merely  would have. As mentioned above, James frequently characterizes 
the practical component in normative terms, so, for instance, appeals to the actions “called for” 
by a particular truth seems better to fi t the normative than the dispositional characterization. 23
 Such a normative understanding of the maxim also seems presupposed by James’s application 
of the maxim to the views of other philosophers, as when he tries to explain the meaning of the 
idealist’s appeal to the ‘Absolute’ in terms of its giving us an  entitlement to take ‘moral holidays.’ 24
James suggested in  Pragmatism that there are no di erences in the “experiences predicted” by 
the idealists and their non-idealist opponents, and that the di erences between the two show up 
in the practical e ects of adopting idealism or not. In particular, given that the world’s salvation 
was, for the idealist, inevitable, their taking the occasional “moral holiday” would be “in order” 
(P: 41). If this were a  dispositional claim, James would obviously be on shaky ground, as there 
isn’t any real evidence that absolute idealists were any more disposed to take moral holidays than 
the rest of us. Further, many of them fl atly rejected James’s suggestion when he presented it in 
Pragmatism (MT: 35). However, if the practical e ects are understood in normative terms, then 
the actual dispositions of the idealists would be less relevant, and the point would be that, if their 
beliefs were true, they would “ have a right ” (P: 41, emphasis added) to take such ‘holidays’ even 
if they weren’t inclined to do so (and even if the rest of us are just as likely to take such holidays, 
our non-idealistic worldview may not entitle us to them). 
 The normative reading seems, of course, best suited for explaining the content of ethical 
discourse, since ethical norms are among those norms that can be built directly into the analysis 
of meaning. On the normative reading, the meaning of “eating meat is always wrong” could be 
spelt out in terms of what the belief actually “calls for”, namely, our never eating meat, and not, 
say, only eating meat when it looks really tasty, even if the latter is what most people would be 
disposed to do if their competing desires were strong enough. 25
 Indeed, while this dispositional/normative split has been discussed here with respect to the 
practical component of the maxim, it can be found with the  sensory component as well. In par-
ticular, we can see a similar split between (1) the experiences that  do lead us to form a particular 
belief, and (2) the experiences that  should lead us to form it. If I’m disposed to think that a cat 
is in front of me when a raccoon passes in front of me in the dark, the dispositional meaning 
of “cat” will include such badly illuminated raccoons, but the normative meaning will not. I 
shouldn’t believe that there is a cat in front of me in that context, as my disposition to correct the 
belief if the lighting improves shows. 
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 Consequently, we have two ways of understanding each of the sensory and practical compo-
nents of James’s maxim, but rather than needing to argue that James must ‘really’ mean just one 
of these two, a good case can be made for him being entitled to help himself to both. 
 5.  e ‘temporary’ and ‘absolute’ content of our beliefs 
 Both the dispositional and normative readings of the pragmatic maxim have something to be 
said for them, and the fact that James’s formulations often straddle the two may be because an 
adequate account of meaning must include both. The purely ‘dispositional’ and the ‘normative’ 
meanings have a role to play, and depending on which of the two you emphasize, you get a 
more ‘subjective’ or ‘objective’ conception of meaning. 
 In particular, the formulations of the maxim that James typically gives tend to be in terms of 
what follow from the  truth of an “object” (VRE: 351), “concept” (MT: 37; SPP: 37), “alterna-
tive” (P: 29), “notion” (P: 28), or “world formula” (P: 30), or simply from a “truth” (P: 259; 
EPh: 124). However, James’s talk of “truth” is itself notoriously elastic, and in  Pragmatism he 
uses the term to talk about everything from the most “temporary truth” (the beliefs that the 
subject  currently takes to be justifi ed) all the way to the “absolute truth” (the beliefs that the 
subject would be justifi ed in having if they achieved a stable end to inquiry into the relevant 
questions). 26 The ‘temporary’ and ‘absolute’ understandings of “truth” give us two versions of 
the pragmatic maxim, so, for instance, when we take a claim of James’s such as: 
 The pragmatic method . . . is to try to interpret each notion by tracing its respective 
practical consequences. What di erence would it practically make to anyone if this 
notion rather than that notion were true? 
 (P: 28) 
 If “true” in this passage is read as “temporarily true”, we get the dispositional reading of the 
maxim, while if it is read as “absolutely true”, we get something like the normative reading. 
 The meaning of a subject’s belief can thus be taken in either an ‘objective’ or a ‘subjective’ 
fashion, with  both being understood, ultimately, in terms of the pragmatic maxim. The subjec-
tive meaning is tied to the experiences which actually would lead the subject to form the belief 
and the actions it actually would lead them to perform, while the objective meaning refl ects the 
experience which  should lead them to form the belief and the actions that they  should perform 
if they had believed it. So for instance, the ‘temporary’ meaning of “cat” is understood in terms 
of those things that I currently take to be cats, and the behaviors that those things currently 
bring about in me, while the ‘absolute’ meaning of “cat” is understood in terms of those things 
that I  should take to be cats, and those behaviors that I should engage in around cats. In James’s 
case, both of these “shoulds” are, crucially, understood in terms of extended rational inquiry. 27
To return to our example earlier, the fact that I  shouldn’t call the poorly eliminated raccoon a 
“cat” is understood in terms of the fact that, if I were to investigate that object further, I would 
eventually conclude that it was a raccoon rather than a cat. 
 While the more temporary/subjective meanings are bound to be idiosyncratic, 28 the abso-
lute/objective meanings are likely to be shared since the experiences that  should lead people 
to have a given belief is likely to be more similar the ones that actually  do . Inquiry is a process 
that itself values agreement (“the satisfaction of hearing you corroborate me”; MT: 118), and 
so the ‘absolute’ meanings of di erent inquirers are likely to converge with each other. If I’m 
inclined to call a pain in my thigh “arthritis”, the temporary meaning for my “arthritis” beliefs 
will include such thigh pain, but given my disposition to accept correction from my doctor, a 
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more objective meaning for my beliefs will tie the meaning of arthritis to the more accepted 
social use. 29
 Of course, the suggestion that there are two sorts of meaning is common in philosophy, 
and distinctions like that between sense and reference, 30 narrow content and wide content, 31
functional role and truth conditions 32 all pick out similar distinctions, with ‘temporary meaning’ 
doing the work that senses, narrow contents and functional roles are expected to do (explaining 
behavior), and ‘absolute meaning’ doing the work expected of referents, wide contents, and 
truth conditions (explaining shared concepts and communication). There is no question for 
James about which of the two is ‘really’ meaning since, for James, “The essence of a thing is that 
one of its properties which is so  important for my interests that in comparison with it I may neglect 
the rest” (PP: 961), 33 and our interests are bound to favor di erent conceptions of meaning in 
di erent contexts. When we are interested in predicting and explaining behavior, the actions 
that the belief actually causes would be the most relevant, and ‘temporary meanings’ capture this 
(in just the way that ‘senses’, ‘narrow contents’ and ‘functional roles’ all hope to). On the other 
hand, when we are more interested in coordinating information about a shared world, it is the 
‘absolute’ meanings that play the central role (in just the way that referents, wide contents and 
truth conditions are expected to). 
 However, the temporary/absolute distinction has the advantage over these ‘two-factor’ 
accounts in that unlike those other theories of content where the two components are so dif-
ferent that one might wonder what holds them together as types of “meaning”, for James there 
is an essential unity behind the multiplicity. The objective meanings are understood in terms 
of the extension of the very practices of inquiry that produced the subjective ones. 34 The sub-
jective meanings refl ect the current state of inquiry, while objective meanings refl ect how we 
would act if we inquired on the relevant matters for long enough. 
 Indeed, one could argue that James’s account allows more of a  continuum than most nar-
row/wide distinctions, so we could have various degrees of ‘communal’ meanings standing 
in between current idiosyncratic meanings and the fully objective ones. 35 (Hence the sense in 
which meaning is ‘elastic’ rather than ‘ambiguous’.) So while the most temporary meaning 
for the beliefs that involve “arthritis” may involve the pains in my joints, and a more objective 
meaning may correspond to expert usage, there may be a still more objective meaning that 
corresponds to what the experts  should be settling on (given that there is always a possibility 
that the current experts are mistaken in their usage). Having something intermediate like this 
would be especially important since in some cases there may not be anything that fi lls the more 
absolute role, and so the more social/temporary meaning may be the only meaning that we 
would ultimately have. 36
 In conclusion, then, while James’s writings on meaning remain underdeveloped, his prag-
matic maxim provides the basis for a fl exible account of content that can both serve our pur-
poses in explaining behavior and coordinating information about a shared world. 
 Notes 
 1  Which I distinguish here from a general story about how thoughts managed to be ‘about’ external 
objects. For a discussion of this (admittedly related) aspect of James’s thought, see Jackman (1998, 
forthcoming ). 
 2  This passage appears verbatim in P (259), EPh (124), and P (29). Virtually the same wording also 
appears in VRE: 351 (with ‘conduct’ replacing ‘reactions’). 
 3  For a discussion of some of these, see Jackman (2016). 
 4  The maxim is so described in P (259), VRE (351), EPh (124), and P (29), and in each of these cases 
he calls back specifi cally to Peirce (1878). 
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 5  For a discussion of this, see Hookway (2004), Misak (2013), and Atkin (2016). In spite of Peirce’s later 
revisions, the version from ‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear’ has had by far the largest impact, and by 
the ‘Peircian’ understanding of the maxim, I will be referring to this infl uential 1878 presentation, not 
to Peirce’s comparatively neglected later thoughts on the topic. 
 6  See, e.g., Lewis (1934: 65), Carnap (1936: 123), Reichenbach (1938: 49), Feigl (1949: 9), Quine 
(1951: 37), and Ayer (1968: 45). For later accounts stressing the di erences between the Peircian and 
the verifi cationist maxims, see Misak (1995), Hookway (2004), and Atkin (2016) – though these all 
lean heavily on work Peirce produced  after ‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear’. 
 7  Like the verifi cation principle, the Peircian version of the pragmatic maxim, with its forward-looking 
emphasis on sensible e ects, has trouble explicating statements that seem to be about the  past , but this 
worry will apply to all versions of the maxim, including James’s. For an extended discussion of this, see 
Jackman (2016). 
 8  See, e.g., Ayer (1936/1946). 
 9  In particular, he suggests that moral questions weren’t proper topics for the sorts of objective inquiry 
he had in mind, and that we were better o  just trusting our instincts in moral matters. See, e.g., the 
fi rst lecture of Peirce (1898); though see also Misak (2002) for the suggestion that he wasn’t really being 
forthright about his own views here). 
 10  Especially since James was keen to insist that pragmatism amounted to ‘a method only’ (P: 31), and 
that it allowed us to clarify philosophical disputes without presupposing what the correct answer to 
those disputes would be. This is not, of course, to say, like Talisse and Aiken (2008 : 14–15), that James 
couldn’t come up with particular answers to philosophical questions once the method is applied, just 
that the method doesn’t rule out answers to substantive questions from the start. 
 11  Atkin (2016: 33, 46) notes that Peirce’s talk of ‘practical bearings’ can seem like a gesture toward the 
practical component, but the ‘practical bearings’ in Peirce’s canonical statement serve as a restriction on 
what sensible e ects may be relevant, not as something additional to them. 
 12  This connection is made verbatim in P (259) and EPh (124) as well. 
 13  Peirce (1878: 131–32). 
 14  One should also note that while James presents this as an argument for the  meaningfulness of the Catho-
lic position, it is not necessarily an argument  in favor of it, and certainly not, as Misak and Talisse (2019) 
suggest, meant to be a ‘decisive’ one. 
 15  See Gale (2010: 110) for a useful discussion of the ‘normative’ vs. the ‘causal’ phrasings of the maxim 
in James. 
 16  P (259) and EPh (124) for reactions and VRE (351) for conduct. 
 17  James also talked of the meaning (and truth) of a concept, notion or idea, but notably, focused on psy-
chological rather than more ‘abstract’ bearers of meaning. In what follows I’ll typically focus on belief. 
 18  The tradition of reading James this way goes back to Lovejoy 1908 (esp. pp. 6–10, 13, 26); for recent 
versions of this reading, see Bacon (2012: 28), Brandom (2011: 20), De Waal (2005: 21), Hookway 
(2010: 8), Misak (2013: 58), Misak and Talisse (2019 ), Rescher (2000: 9), Suckiel (2006: 33), and 
Talisse and Aikin (2008 : 11–13). 
 19  See, e.g., VRE (351), EPh (94), P (28–30), MT (37), and SPP (37). 
 20  James’s skepticism about the value of positing propositions as intermediaries between our thought 
and talk and the realities we think and talk about is well known (see, e.g., MY: 151), and it seriously 
misstates James’s position to claim that his formulation of Peirce’s principle ‘is essentially a meaning 
criterion for propositions’ (Madden 1953: 66). 
 21  Virtually the same passage appears in James (EPh: 123–24), and James puts the maxim in a much the 
same context in a very similar passage in James (VRE: 351). 
  Peirce presents a similar picture of belief in ‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear’ according to which dif-
ferent beliefs are distinguished according to the di erent ‘rules of action’ they produce (Peirce 1878: 
130). Unfortunately, Peirce doesn’t fully connect it to the discussion of meaning in that paper. (Since 
the Catholic and Protestant understanding of the Eucharist don’t produce ‘the same rule of action’, 
they arguably shouldn’t be the same even by Peirce’s own lights.) Indeed, Peirce’s more verifi cationist 
presentation of the maxim may just have been a temporary, if infl uential, aberration on his part, and it 
may be that something more like the two pronged conception was in play when Peirce and James (both 
under the infl uence of Bain [1859]), discussed the material that went on to become ‘How to Make 
Our Ideas Clear’ in the ‘metaphysical club’ meetings of the early 1870s. (This might explain why James 
tended to understate the di erences between his own position and the views Peirce actually presented 
in the published paper.) 
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 22  Though James does later admit that this picture of the refl ex arc is a little too simplistic (see WB: 
192–93; PP; C5: 32). 
 23  It should be noted that, in spite of originally presenting the maxim as tying meaning exclusively to 
sensory e ects in ‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear’, Peirce himself ultimately comes to present the 
maxim in much this way, saying that the maxim ties meaning to the actions that we rationally ought 
to perform (Peirce 1903: 134–35, 1905: 346). Ironically, around the time of these later reformulations, 
Peirce claimed, in his characteristically uncharitable fashion, that it was  James ’s maxim that tied mean-
ing exclusively to ‘the sensational side of experience’; excerpt from a 1904 letter from Peirce quoted in 
Ladd-Franklin (1916: 718). 
 24  He has in mind here writers like Royce (1885) and Bradley (1893). 
 25  Of course, this only follows if there  is something that we ought to do, and James ultimately gives us 
reason to doubt that this may be the case (for a discussion of this, see Jackman 2019), but the point is 
that the  semantic theory doesn’t pre-judge the question, so that pragmatism remains ‘a method only’ (P: 
31). 
 26  See Jackman (2021). 
 27  With these two components in play, it might seem as if we could have a ‘mixed’ ascription that under-
stood, say, the sensory component in dispositional terms and the practical component in normative 
terms, but it’s not clear that, even if we did want to do this for some reason, this would be a coherent 
option on James’s view, since the process of inquiry by which the components are refi ned is bound to 
refi ne both. 
 28  While the dispositional reading seems to give  everyone’s belief at least a slightly di erent content (since 
no belief will have all of the same consequences for any two people), contemporary defenders of func-
tional role semantics (see Block 1986) seem willing to bite this bullet, and insist that for at least one 
component of meaning, similarity (rather than identity) of meaning may be all that we need (for a dis-
cussion of this, see Jackman 2020), and there is little reason to think that James couldn’t make the same 
move, especially since he has absolute meanings to appeal to when coordination must be explained. 
 29  The example is, of course, familiar from Burge (1979). We see, of course, a similar split on the practical 
level. The temporary meaning of my arthritis beliefs may involve rubbing olive oil on the relevant parts 
of my body, while the more objective meaning may replace this disposition with taking aspirin. 
 30  Frege (1892). 
 31  McGinn (1982). 
 32  Block (1987). 
 33  James can thus ultimately be understood as a type of contextualist about meanings the way he is for 
everything else, and would likely be sympathetic with Lycan’s ‘Double Indexical Theory of Meaning’, 
where ‘MEANING =def Whatever aspect of linguistic activity happens to interest  me now ’ (Lycan 
1984 : 272). 
 34  And if it is for just this reason that James claims that the pragmatic defi nition of truth applies to  both
absolute and temporary truth (ML: 433). 
 35  James could thus give a unifi ed account of not only the contemporary narrow/wide distinction, but 
also that between social and objective meaning that Sawyer (2018) posits as that between ‘linguistic 
meanings’ and ‘concepts’. See also Burge’s related distinction between ‘conventional meaning’ and 
‘cognitive value’ (Burge 1986). 
 36  Our ethical beliefs might be a candidate for this. 
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